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Courts split over Fol defamation threat to whistleblowers
Introduction
Suppose you are a 'whistleblower' and you write a letter
.to a government department that defames a person. And
suppose that person retrieves the document by virtue of
the Freedom of Infonnation Act (Fol Act). The whistle-
.blower would be protected by the Act from a defamation
action, right? Wrong. Or, more correctly, it depends on
what state you live in. As a result of recent decisions in
Queensland and New South Wales, "authors of docu-
ments subject to discovery under the Fol Act may find
they are not 'protected from actions for·defamation. ~ ~, ,-
)' ....~'-"'" .~.' .... ~.. ~ ..,' ...,'":.' ';. "'.' " ,'.
, This is despite the operation ,of s 91 sub-s.91 (1)(b) of
the Commonwealth 'Freedom '0; Inforniatiofr Acl1982.
The meaning of this provision, which is mirrored in the Fol
legislation of the states, has been the subject of a number
of conflicting decisions. Section 91 provides: ~ ,
(1) ';"'here a~~ ha"b~en given to a d~;"ent and:
, , ,
(a) the access was required or pennitted by this Act to be given
or would, but for the operation of subsection 12(2) or of that
subsection 12(3), or olthat subsection as modified by regu·
lations made in pursuance of subsection 12(3), having so re-
quired to be given; or
(b) the access was authorised by' a Minister, or by an officer
having authority under section 23 or 54, to make decisions in
. respect of requests, in the bona fide belief that the access
was reqUired by this Act to be given;
no action of defamation or Breach of confidence or infringement
of copyright lies against the commonwealth, an agency, a
Minister or officer by reason of the authorising or giving of the
access, an~ no action for defamation or breach of confidence in
respect of any publication Involved In, or resulting from, the
giving of the acce~ lies against the author of the document or
any otherperson by reason of that author orother person having
supplied the document to any agency or Minister,
The matter of what for the purposes of this article may
be described as the 'protection from defamation action
clause' arose most recently in Pal v Weir' in Caims before
White DCJ. In an action for damages for defamation the
plaintiff's action was based on two alleged publications.
One of these included publication of a letter conceming
the plaintiff to the then Queensland Premier, a number of
Members of Parliament, a local government officer and
.the producer of the ABC Television Four Corners pro-
gram. White DC J took the view that the construction of
paragraph (d) should be approached in a mannerconsis-
tent with, and against the background of the provisions of
the Queensland Defamation Act 1899 especially as it
relates to publication.2 Although the Defamation Actdoes
not define what publication means the cases dealing with
the tort of defamation maintain the plaintiff must establish
that the material complained of has been communicated
to a third person,3 The first point White DCJ raised was
that what is protected by the Fol Act is 'any publication'.
The second point, according to his Honour, was that the
protected publication is not any publication involved in the
supplying of the document to an agency or minister but a
publication involved in, or resulting from 1he giving of
access', His Honour argued that if the legislature intended
to protect the original publication of the document to an
agency or minister from an action for defamation or
breach of confidence, ~ could have easily said so, but it
did not. Secondly, in His Honour's view, paragraph (b) did
not protect documents: it only protected publications.
Furthermore, it did not protect all publications of a docu-
ment, only those 'involved in or resulting from the giving of
the access'.' His Honour could not be persuaded that the
publication of a letter by supplying it to an agency or min-
.ister'co'(ild possibly be characterised as being'involved in
.or resulting from the giving of access. '
.' ..~'I: ~'-':1 i '. '''''''f~:' -. ~-. -','. (1 r.': -
, A contrary view';·, ";",,c._,'.":: ',','.';"'.i..'" ;:~<.:,' "
.. ~'I'\., .. . _. .~ __ . _ _ .. ,00 • .l
The matteralsoarose in July last year in NSW in AinswOl1h
v Burderr but the decision there was the reverSe. There,
the plaintiff acting under the Freedom of Infonnafion Act
1989 (NSW), obtained acopy ~of a letter written by the
defendant to a Minister of the Crown which allegedly
defamed him. He brought an action for defamation based
on the publication to the Minister. The defendant applied
for the action to be permanently stayed on the ground that
the publication was the subject of absolute privilege
under s 64(1 )(b) of the Act that essentially mirrors the
Commonwealth Fol Act. Simpson J held that the publica-
tion of the letter to the Minister was protected by sub-s
(1)(b). Her Honour indicated she preferred a plain words
interpretation of the sub-section that protects the author
of a document who has supplied the document to a Minis-
ter, against actions for defamation as a result of a grant of
access to the document.' Significantly though, her inter-
pretation was reached by excluding the words of limita-
tion, namely: 'publication involved in, or resulting from,
the giving of access'.
Her Honour agreed with the proposition that the pur·
pose behind the Fol Act supports t~ notion that the
author of a document is protected in respect of the original
publication of that document, where the plaintiff comes into
possession of the document as a result of the Fol Act.
This simply means that the legislature determined that
the Act would not become a source of material to be used
against individuals providing information to govemment
Ministers or agencies. It was Her Honour's view that the
sub-section was constructed in such a way that a plaintiff
who comes into possession of a defamatory document by
means other than the Act is not prevented from taking
action. It is only where the procedures provided by the Act
have the effect of disclosing a document that the protec-
tion afforded by the section arises.
Her Honour was guided by a decision by the Full Court
of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Morgan v Mal-
lard.' There a document, which the appellant claimed
defamed her, came into her hands as a result of the pro-
cess of discovery. It was held that, absent a grant of
leave, the plaintiff could not use the document so pro-
duced in order to found an action for defamation. How-
ever, in coming to that view, the Full Court considered
whether the appellant would be able to use the same
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public interest. Ignorance of the law is, of course, no
excuse but surely the Fol Act should be devoid of legal
technicalities if it is to do the job Parliament intended. It is
unlikely to achieve this level of user friendliness n a
whistleblower has to seek legal advice before writing a
letter to the relevant public official. . I . - .
• ' • ::C-l ·..·.::'·<:1}j!,;;; -,',:_ -,'
Protection from republication . ..' ,
Section 64 (1 )(a) proteCtS pUblic officials from liability for
republication of defamatoi}l matter pursuant io the Act.
Section 64(1 )(b) extends that protection to the author and
other persons. Protection for other people was riecessary
because someone other than the author may have sent
. the. document to the public .official. For example, an
employee may have made a report to his employer, which
the latter sent to the public official. The employer would
have republished the defamatory material and thus been
exposed, like the author, to defamation proceedings aris-'
ing out of ijs further republication pursuant to the Act
unless statutory protection had been provided.. But its
protection is limited to 'any pUblication involved in; or
resulting from, the giving of access' 'under the Act. As
noted above, these were not considered words of limita-
tion by the Primary Judge. Protection is conferred by
s 64(1)(b) where liability could arise because ('by reason
of) the author or other person supplied the document to a
public official. According to Handley JA,' with whom
Hodgson JA and Grove J agreed, that is the reason for
protection being given. However, in .their opinion the
words 'by reason of do not define its scope. This is
defined by the words 'in respect of any publication
involved in, or resulting from the giving of access'. Protec-
tion is not given in, respect of other publications, made to
the public official or anyone else.17 Under this reasoning
the section gives no protection to the author or other per-
son merely because the plaintiff became aware of the
document by obtaining access to it under the Act and
would not otherwise have known that he had been
defamed, or been in a position to prove this. The protec-
tion is nol given against the use of the document; it is
given against an action for defamation in respect of
defined publications. .
In the opinion of Handley JA, the evident purpose of
s 64 was to ensure that the Act did not widen liability for
defamation by a side wind. There is nothing in s 64 to indi-
cate that it was intended to protect publications made
independently of the Act:
This interpretation was previously reached by Deputy
President Forgie of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
in the Queensland case ReMcKinnon & Powell v Depart-
ment of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs." This mattercon-
cerned the Commonwealth provision. Deputy President
Forgie held:
The focus of s 91 Is solely upon the' republication of the mattei in
a document released under the Fol Act. It does not in any way
attract the liability of the original author of the document when he
, or she sends or gives it !o a Minister or agency. The initial
transmission of the matter In the document is itself publication of
the matter and something in respect of which an action for
defamation may be brought. SeCtion 91 iloes not protect the
author of the document in respect of that original publication,"
" '., . t, ': ,,' , :r- : ".
letter if she obtained ij as a result of an application under
the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA).
Bleby J, with whom Mullighan and Wicks JJ agreed,
wrote: ' '" i.·I. i.
(31) In this case, to the extent thai the letter in question has been
produced to the appellant under the provisions of the Freedom
of Information Act 1991, s50 (1 )(b) would prevent her from using
It for the purpose of maintaining the present ection for
defamation. That is because it is the subject of protection under
s51 (b) as a document produced by reason of the author having
supplied it to Workcover Corp. However, beCause tt was also
supplied to her in a different capaci1y, as a litigant in the
Magistrate's Court, she may be able to use It either wtth the
consent of the respondent or by leave of that Court.'
A similar question Came 'before JC Gibs'on DCJ in"
McFarlane v the Commonwealth of Australia' Again the
legislation contained sutistimtially the same prOVisions to
s 91 of the Freedom of Infoimation Act 1982 (Cth). Gib-
son DCJ came to a' conclusion similar to that reached in
Morgan. . .. .
The latest decision " ., , ,
However, when Ainsworth v Burden'· came on appeal
before the New South Wales Court of Appeal in April of
this year ij was held the se.ction only protected pUblica-
tions pursuant to the Act, arid did not protect the original
publication to the Minister. The Full Bench following Pal v
Weirsaid the statutory language must be construed in the
context of the general principles of the law of defama-
tion." Jhat is, each republication of defamatory matter is
a newpUblication, which exposes the republisher to liabil-
ity in' defamation. RepUblication may also expose the
original publisher to further liability where the
republication was the natural and probable result of the
original publication12 either on a fresh cause of action or
for increased damages on the original cause of action. 13 It
was their Honour's view that, in the absence of statutory
protection, public authorities and their employees who,
under Fol legislation, released documents containing
defamatory imputations against third parties, orwho were
involved in the decision-making process heading to such
release, would be exposed to actions for defamation."
People writing to a Minister, pUblic authority, or a pub-
lic servant complaining of alleged crimes, other wrongdo-
ing or alleged abuses in public administration, may be
protected by qualified privilege under common law or
statute, subject to the condition at common law that the
publication must not be more extensive than the privilege
justifies." Therefore, 'according to the Full Bench in
Ainsworth v Burden, without statutory protection a person
publishing defamatory matter to a pUblic servant or politi-
cian, on what otherwise would have been an occasion of
qualified privilege, loses that priVilege if republication to
third persons was the natural and probable result of that
publication. Republication pursuant to the legislation
would be outside the protection of the qualified privilege
which would not protect' publication to third persons.'·
While this argument may be legally correct, one wonders
whether a 'whislleblower' would have this degree of
knowledge of what constitutes defamation when writing a
letter on what he or she genuinely thinks is a matter in the
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This construction of the legislation was accepted by
Handley JA in Ainsworlh v Burden where he said the
important words of limitation were: '[publication] involved
in, or resulting from, the giving of access'.20 If parliament
had wished to protect defamatory publications made
independently of this Act, he said, the result could have
been achieved by omitting these words from s 64(1 )(b).21
In this writer's opinion this would appear to be the correct
legal interpretation but it offends the spirit of Fol legisla-
tion. The challenge now is to persuade parliament to
amend the legislation that omits the limiting words in the
interests of Fo!.
. .,'
Summary,: ....
The fact that Australian courts are split.over the interpre-
tation of the defamation protection clause is highly unsat-
isfactory. The interpretation of the protection clause
obviously leads to a balancing act between protecting an
individual's reputation as opposed to the public interest in
preserving the spirit of Fo!. It must be remembered Fol
was designed as one of the few tools available to the pub-
lic to help ensure the integrity of our public officials. If a
balancing test is required then surely it should come
down on the side of Fol rather than the protection of an
individual's reputation. As a result of the most recent deci-
sions concerning the protection from defamationclause
our 'whistleblowers' could now be forgiven if they kept
~heir powder dry' for fear of a defamation writ to the detri-
ment of the wider public interest. This is surely not what
our legislators intended. It is over to them to fix it.
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An update on Access to Information in South Africa
New directions in transparency'
A brief description of the Promotion of Access to
Information Act
South Africa's new freedom of information legislation -
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000
(PAIA) - came fully into effect on 15 February 2002:
The Act is general freedom of information (Fol) legisla-
tion, largely modeled on the Follaws of the United States
and Commonwealth jurisdictions.3 lt is, however, unusual
in at least two respects. First, it is based on and is backed
up by a specific constitutional right of access to informa-
tion, entrenched in the South African Bill of Rights. Sec-
ondly, this right, and as a consequence, the Act, is
applicable not only to information in government hands
but also to information held in the private sector.
The Act applies to records held by public bodies and
private bodies, irrespective of what date the records were
created. Public bodies are defined as including any func-
tionary or entity in any branch of the state at any of its three
levels: legislatures, courts, members of the executive or
.any government or state department at national,
provincial or locallevel.4 The definition also includes func-
tionaries or institutions that are classifiable as part of the
private sector when they exercise a pUblic power or func-
tion. Private bodies are defined as any person or entity
that is not a public body and that is not a natural person
carrying on a trade, business or profession.' Putting the
definition of pUblic and private body together, the Act has
extensive but not universal application. Essentially, the
only bodies that are not covered by the AlA are natural per-
sons in their private capacity. All other legal persons are
either pUblic or private bodies under the Act.
The Act creates a statutory right of access on request
to any record· held by a public body, with the exception of
records held by the Cabinet, court records and records
held by members of parliament and prOVincial legisla-
tures. The Act provides a similar statutory right of access
to records held by private bodies, to the extent that the
requester can show that a requested record is required
for the exercise or protection of the rights of any person.
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